The New Resilience of Emerging and Developing Countries: Systemic Interlocking, Currency Swaps and Geoeconomics abstract
The vulnerability/resilience nexus that defined the interaction between advanced and developing economies in the post-WWII era is undergoing a fundamental transformation. Yet, most of the debate in the current literature is focusing on the structural constraints faced by the Emerging and Developing Countries (EDCs) and the lack of changes in the formal structures of global economic governance. This paper challenges this literature and its conclusions by focusing on the new conditions of systemic interlocking between advanced and emerging economies, and by analysing how large EDCs have built and are strengthening their economic resilience. We find that a significant redistribution of 'policy space' between advanced and emerging economies have taken place in the global economy. We also find that a number of seemingly technical currency swap agreements among EDCs have set in motion changes in the very structure of global trade and finance. These developments do not signify the end of EDCs' vulnerability towards advanced economies. They signify however that the economic and geoeconomic implications of this vulnerability have changed in ways that constrain the options available to advanced economies and pose new challenges for the post-WWII economic order.
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Introduction
The emerging and developing countries (EDCs) 1 demonstrated unexpected resilience in the face of global economic crisis 2 . There have not been generalised currencycollapses, bank insolvencies, and debt defaults. On the contrary, it was the first time in modern history that EDCs, especially emerging powers, not only demonstrated strong capacity to use countercyclical economic measures (Didier et al., 2012) , but also bailed out the advanced economies (see for instance Bracke et al., 2008, pp. 13-16) . Thus massive amounts of money moved, mostly through sovereign wealth funds, from EDCs to advanced economies, offering critical support for the recapitalisation of a great number of leading western banks and corporations.
This paper focuses on this 'new resilience' of emerging and developing countries.
Resilience is a relative not an absolute quality. The resilience demonstrated by the emerging and developing countries, does not mean that these countries do not remain vulnerable to economic trends and changes taking place in the advanced economies. It indicates, however, that the degree of this vulnerability and the way it functions may have changed. In this context, the paper examines the factors that underlie this new resilience, and its implications for the emerging powers of the global South.
Resilience is conceptualised as the ability of the EDCs to deal with external economic shocks and persistent adverse international economic conditions (e.g. a prolonged period of low growth or high interest rates in advanced economies) 3 . The EDCs' resilience may increase or decrease as a result of domestic economic conditions and policies, the frequency, duration and intensity of the adverse external developments, as well as broader changes in the global distribution of power and wealth. The ability of the EDCs to endure external volatility, crises and shocks, is also determined by the wider structure of the global political economy, and the way in which (different) EDCs are integrated in it. It is this mode of integration that determines the nature and degree of exposure and the vulnerabilities experienced by the EDCs in the global economy, as well as the parameters, effectiveness and limits of their resilience-related policies and strategies. Resilience is not and cannot be captured and analysed just as a set of economic indicators (e.g. GDP growth, debt exposure). To capture this embedded approach to resilience, the paper uses the concept of 'vulnerability/resilience nexus'.
The concept of nexus aims to signify the dynamic nature of the interaction between vulnerability structures and resilience strategies, and the multiple points of 'equilibrium' and possibilities for transformation generated by this interaction. In this context, our aim in this paper is not only to account for the factors that underlie the resilience demonstrated by the EDCs, but also to examine whether and how current EDCs' policies have the ability to challenge the very vulnerability structure within which this resilience operates. This would signify a transformation of the 'resilience capacity' of EDCs, rather than just an increase in their 'ability to endure' external crises.
Despite modest growth in advanced economies, the EDCs demonstrated impressive growth rates over the last decade. This threw the traditional EDCs' vulnerability analysis into sharp relief, and questioned the 'conventional wisdom that when the US economy sneezes the rest of the world catches a cold' (Kose and Prasad, 2010, p. 2) .
As a result there has been a new wave of econometric studies examining the decoupling hypothesis, i.e. whether the divergence in the business cycles of the advanced and emerging economies, and the increased trade and financial integration among the emerging economies, have made the EDCs less dependent on and vulnerable to advanced economies. The findings of these studies have been inconclusive, with some authors finding evidence in favour of the decoupling thesis (Kose and Prasad, 2010, chs 7-9) , others pointing to exactly the opposite direction of recoupling and increased interdependence (Kim et al., 2011) , and some referring to decoupling in terms of business cycles but recoupling in terms of financial markets (Levy Yeyati and Williams, 2012 ; for a review see also Christian Buelens, 2013, pp. 30-36 ). Yet, this de/recoupling literature offers us a rather static perspective on the EDCs' place in the global economy.
Put differently, it tell us very few things about what is actually happening on the ground, in terms of new power configurations and institutional arrangements, and how these developments may impact on and transform the EDCs' resilience capacity.
Another wave of literature has attempted to avoid this static approach by developing an agent-centric perspective (see the contributions in Helleiner et al., 2009; Gray and Murphy, 2013 is going on 'on the ground' rather than just the manifested impact of this agency on formal multilateral structures of governance (e.g. changes in voting power in IMF).
Following this rationale, our aim in this paper is to examine what 'resilience capacity' is generated by an emergent network of dispersed but interlocking arrangements and practices produced by the EDCs themselves.
Global rebalancing
The global economic crisis led to a rapid global readjustment between the advanced and emerging/developing economies. Table 1 , relates both to a change in the exchange rates and to a fall in consumption in the advanced economies. That is, it had to do both with less imports and more exports on the side of the deficit advanced economies. 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 Current account balance % GDP
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Emerging and developing economies contrary, the growth rate difference between the two groups of countries, observed after 2000, was maintained (see Table 2 ). In this way, rather than collapsing after the The broader historical-economic context of the above readjustment and growth trends is even more striking (Table 3a) . Measured in purchasing power parity (PPP), in 1990, was the first year that the EDCs' contribution to global GDP exceeded that of the developed economies (51 per cent for the developing countries). By 2015, this gap in favour of the EDCs, had been widened to 58 vs. 42 per cent. Furthermore, 2014 was the first year that in PPP terms China overtook the US as the largest economy of the world, a trend that is projected to continue thereafter (Table 3b) . Respectively, BRIC's contribution to global GDP has almost reached that of G7 economies in 2015 (31.5 vs. 
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Advanced economies Emerging and developing economies 30.2 per cent), and according to IMF projections 2017 will be the first year that BRIC's contribution to global GDP will exceed that of G7. In current prices the EDC's contribution to global GDP has almost doubled from 20% in 2000 to 39% in 2016 (Table 3c) 4 . 
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The above evidence points clearly to a long-term historical transformation: a rebalancing of the global economy on the basis of the growing weight of emerging and developing countries (see also Quah, 2011; Christian Buelens, 2013) . And this points to a transformation of the very context that defined the EDCs' post-WWII conditions of vulnerability and resilience. Through this transformation large EDCs emerge as 'systemically important' global actors. This is clearly the case for China but to a lesser degree applies to all BRIC countries. The concept of 'systemically important' denotes that any significant change in these economies has an impact on the global economy as a whole. In this sense, the stability/instability of these countries influences the stability/instability of the global economy, to a degree higher than any other time in the post WWII period. Thus, a major crisis in China is bound to have a major impact on the global economy, in the same way (but not necessarily to the same degree and through the same channels) that a crisis in the US economy impacts on the rest of the world (see also Kim et al., 2011; Christian Buelens, 2013 in EDCs should be read in this light. The emerging economies could not continue to grow fast, while growth remained subdued in advanced economies. But, the opposite is also true now, i.e. any recovery in the advanced economies will not be sustainable in a global environment characterised by collapsing EDCs. These conditions of 'systemic interlocking' increase the EDCs' leverage in the global economy, but most importantly changes the very structure in which the EDCs' vulnerability/resilience nexus traditionally operated. Thus, whereas in the past, EDCs' crisis contagion could be contained by advanced economies, in the current context a crisis in EDCs is bound to have global repercussions, affecting if not derailing the fragile recovery of advanced economies. Put differently, the emergence of systemic interlocking between advanced economies and EDCs has led to a new global economic chessboard.
The turning point that led to new resilience
The turning point for the emergence of EDCs' new resilience was the 1997/98 Asian economic crisis, and the IMF-led socially devastating structural adjustment process that followed the crisis (indicatively see Chin, 2010; Bowles, 2002; Mendoza, 2010; Helleiner, 2014, pp. 31-34; Golub, 2013) . This negative experience led to a rupture in the mode of integration of large emerging and developing economies in the global economy, by forcing them to adopt a 'self-insurance' strategy against the speculative nature of global finance (Chin, 2010; Mendoza, 2010; Kose and Prasad, 2010 ch.13; Didier et al., 2012; . In this sense, the Asian financial crisis has been a significant geoeconomic moment for the large EDCs and the global economy 5 . Two critical and interrelated elements stand out here. Leung, 2014) . It is also worth pointing out that the fact that many EDCs had shifted from policies of fixed exchange rates to flexible exchange rates, before the outbreak of the 2008/09 crisis, increased their ability to weather through the initial shock of these abrupt capital flow reversals (Berkmen et al., 2012; Tsangarides, 2012; Didier et al., 2012) .
Second, the capital flows with regard to long-term direct investments ( Furthermore, recent evidence suggests that the EDCs' sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) are now more willing to diversify their exposure in advanced economies, by moving some funds back home. Such reverse flows by SWFs aim and are able to help EDCs to ease the impact of temporary capital outflows (SWFI, 2014; Halland et al., 2014) . Thus, the acquisition of foreign assets through direct (and in many cases portfolio) investments has added one more 'resilience layer' for large EDCs, helping them to temper adverse capital flows and policies initiated in advanced economies. (BIS, 2015, pp. 3-4 ).
The EDCs' emergent resilience infrastructure
Yet, it would be a mistake to reduce our reading of the global economy and the EDCs' vulnerability/resilience nexus to the dominant role of the US dollar. Rather we should examine how the large EDCs deal with this traditional source of vulnerability and whether their current responses are able to generate broader changes. In this framework, the impact of a new wave of currency swap agreements (CSAs) among EDCs should not be underestimated. These agreements enhance the EDCs' resilience by strengthening their foreign currency liquidity, and therefore their capacity to deal with crises related to their balance of payments and external debt. In addition, these agreements facilitate the settlement of cross-border trade and investments in local currencies, thus offering an alternative to the use of US dollar.
At the centre of these new CSAs dynamics is China. As part of its strategy to internationalise the renminbi, China has by far the most extended network of bilateral currency swap agreements (Liao and Mcdowell, 2014; Destais, 2014 introduced a pilot scheme for renminbi trade settlements. The impact that this strategy had on the first four years of its implementation was impressive (see Table 5 Arabia (Cunningham, 2015) . Furthermore, the ruble was one of three currencies for which China launched a swap and forward contracts trade, in December 2014. In 2014 the total trade in renminbi on the Moscow Stock Exchange increased eight times, reaching 395 billion rubles (48 billion yuan) (Pravda, 2015) .
of EDCs, it does not signify a shift away from relations of power and dependency in the global economy, but rather a complex and slowly moving game of displacement and reordering of these power relations. In this way it will create new imbalances and dependencies in their current and capital accounts. But by creating (more) options for weaker EDCs, it increases their resilience and leverage, and by doing so it creates new policy space for them which was not there before.
The Beyond however the bilateral level, there is also a wide range of new plurilateral CSAs among the EDCs (for a recent overview see Miyoshi and et al., 2013 ; see also Golub, 2013 Golub, , pp. 1010 Huotari and Hanemann, 2014, pp. 305-6) . The main point here is that along with the emergent network of bilateral CSAs, there is also an expanding network of new plurilateral funding arrangements and institutions, mostly driven by BRIC countries. These arrangements make further resources available to EDCs (both outside and in conjunction with the traditional Bretton Wood system), thus enhancing the ability of emerging and developing countries to respond to adverse economic conditions. As mentioned above, these new arrangements are not foreign to national interests, biases and power relations. Rather the opposite. If successful, they will generate and consolidate their own ('non Western') bias and power relationships.
Yet, these developments clearly increase the policy space and alternatives available to the emerging and developing countries. 1 The paper follows the IMF classification for 'advanced economies' (39 countries), and 'emerging and developing economies' (152 countries). Whenever needed, we narrow down the focus of our analysis on emerging powers, defined as the developing countries that are members of G20.
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